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Abstract 
Between-list manipulations of memory strength through repetition commonly generate a mirror effect, with 
more hits, and fewer false alarms for strengthened items. However, this pattern is rarely seen with within-
list manipulations of strength. Three experiments investigated the conditions under which a within-list 
mirror effect of strength (items presented once or thrice) is observed. In Experiments 1 and 2, we 
indirectly manipulated the overall subjective memorability of the studied lists by varying the proportion of 
non-words. A within-list mirror effect was observed only in Experiment 2, where a higher proportion of 
non-words was presented in the study list. In Experiment 3, the presentation duration for each item (0.5 s 
versus 3 s) was manipulated between groups with the purpose of affecting subjective memorability: A 
within-list mirror effect was observed only for the short-presentation durations. Thus, across three 
experiments, we found the within-list mirror effect only under conditions of poor overall subjective 
memorability. We propose that when the overall subjective memorability is low, people switch their 
response strategy on an item-by-item basis, and that this generates the observed mirror effect.  
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Global Subjective Memorability and the Strength-Based Mirror Effect in Recognition Memory 
In recognition memory experiments, participants first study a list of items and then later, in a 
recognition memory test, they attempt to discriminate previously presented items (targets) from novel 
ones (distractors). A commonly used conceptual tool for understanding recognition memory performance 
is signal detection theory (SDT). According to SDT, targets and distractors on the recognition memory 
test are each distributed over a psychological strength-of-evidence dimension, with targets having higher 
mean strength than distractors (Figure 1). To make a recognition decision, participants are assumed to 
adopt a response criterion (c in Figure 1) somewhere along the strength-of-evidence dimension. If a test 
item has strength equal to or above the criterion, it is judged “old”, otherwise, it is judged “new”. The 
proportion of targets and distractors that are called “old” are dubbed the hit rate (HR) and false alarm rate 
(FAR), respectively.  
The mirror effect is a phenomenon of recognition memory in which better old/new discrimination 
in one condition versus another is manifested as both a higher HR and a lower FAR (e.g., Glanzer & 
Adams, 1985; Glanzer, Adams, Iverson & Kim, 1993). The consistency with which the mirror effect has 
been observed with different recognition tasks and with different experimental manipulations, led Glanzer 
et al. to describe it as a “regularity” (p. 546) of recognition memory.  
Stretch and Wixted (1998) investigated the causes of the word frequency and the repetition-
based mirror effects, and concluded that the latter is a consequence of a shift in the placement of the 
SDT response criterion. An example of criterion shift is presented in Figure 2. In this case, strong targets 
(Ts) have been strengthened through study repetitions or increased presentation time so that they have 
higher strength-of-evidence than weak targets (TW). In Figure 2, this graphically translates into the TS 
distribution being shifted to the right on the strength-of-evidence axis relative to the TW distribution. The 
distractor (D) distribution is low on the strength-of-evidence axis because distractors were not presented 
at study. Only one distractor distribution appears in Figure 2 because it is assumed that the strength 
manipulation only exerts an effect on targets, as it happens at encoding, and not on distractors. Placing 
response criteria at the intersection point of the target and distractor distributions for both the weak and 
strong conditions (i.e., the point corresponding to the optimal observer, c = 0; see Macmillan & Creelman, 
2005) creates cw and cS, respectively. As can be observed in Figure 2, due to the positioning of the 
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criteria and distributions, more “old” responses are given to TS (with respect to cs) than to Tw (with respect 
to cw). Additionally, fewer “old” responses are given to distractors in the strong condition than in the weak 
condition. In other words, there is a higher HR and a lower FAR in the strong condition compared to the 
weak condition: the mirror effect. 
 Stretch and Wixted (1998) suggested that this explanation of the strength-based mirror effect 
applied when the strength manipulation occurred between lists. This explanation is rooted in the work of 
Brown, Lewis and Monk (1977; Brown, 1976). According to these theorists, participants judge items to be 
more or less memorable according to several variables, such as the nature of the item itself (e.g., 
distinctive versus non-distinctive words), the length of the retention interval, a change in context between 
study and test, or the number of times a study item is presented. According to Brown et al., if items are 
judged to be memorable, a strong sense of prior occurrence is expected for them at test. Therefore, 
recognition performance can be improved (i.e., accuracy will be higher) if the response criterion is placed 
high on the strength-of-evidence axis than if placed lower down, mostly because the FAR will decrease 
substantially.  
In the study phase of their first experiment, Stretch and Wixted (1998) presented half of the 
participants with a list of weak items (each word presented once) and the other half with a list of strong 
items (each word presented three times). Also, half of the items in each list were high frequency words 
and the other half were low frequency words. Participants were then administered an old-new recognition 
test consisting of low and high frequency targets and distractors. The study-test block was then repeated, 
but participants who were initially assigned to the weak condition were now assigned to the strong 
condition, and vice versa. Stretch and Wixted predicted that the response criterion would be lower 
following a weak list than a strong list because weak items would be judged harder to remember (i.e., less 
memorable). Consistent with this prediction, a mirror effect was found. Because the strength manipulation 
occurred at study and did not affect the distractor items, Stretch and Wixted assumed that their results 
were an example of criterion-shift mirror effect. Indeed, a mirror effect based on different distractor 
distributions was not deemed possible given that the strong and weak distractors were “physically 
identical” (p. 1384) and hence should not occupy different positions on the strength-of-evidence 
dimension. 
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The mirror effect is observed regularly when strength is manipulated between lists (i.e., strong 
and weak items are studied in separate lists). In contrast, when strength is manipulated within lists (i.e., 
strong and weak items are studied and tested together in randomly mixed lists), a mirror effect is rarely 
observed. According to Stretch and Wixted (1998), participants are unlikely to shift their response 
criterion on a trial-by-trial basis according to whether a strong or weak item is presented at test. 
Consistent with this prediction, no mirror effect was observed in any of Stretch and Wixted’s experiments 
when strength was manipulated within lists. For example, in their Experiment 5, participants studied a list 
of words, half of which were presented five times in one color (strong condition) and half presented only 
once in another color (weak condition). Instructions were very clear about the difference in strength 
between words and also about the association between strength levels and colors. At test, participants 
were presented with targets and distractors, and both classes of items were associated with the same 
colors as at study (distractors in the strong and weak conditions were in the same colors as targets in the 
strong and weak conditions, respectively). Results showed no strength-based mirror effect; although 
recognition performance was better for strong words than weak words as measured by d’, this effect 
came about because of a difference in the HR between the strength conditions, not because of a FAR 
difference.  
Since Stretch and Wixted’s (1998) crucial experiments were published, the strength-based, 
within-list mirror effect has remained elusive. Morrell, Gaitan and Wixted (2002; Experiment 1), for 
example, presented participants with words belonging to two different semantic categories (geographical 
locations & professions) at study and strengthened only words in one of the categories by repeating them 
five times. Similar to Stretch and Wixted, no mirror effect was detected: The HR was greater in the strong 
condition compared to the weak condition, but no difference was observed in the FAR between strong 
distractors from one category versus weak distractors from the other.1 Morrell et al. also increased the 
salience of the strength manipulation by replacing the list of words representing geographical locations 
with a list of pictures representing animals (Experiments 2 & 3), but again, no mirror effect was observed; 
only the HR differed between the strength conditions. More recently, Higham, Perfect, and Bruno (2009) 
manipulated strength within lists and additionally used labels at test to indicate whether each test item 
belonged to the strong or weak condition. These labels ensured that participants did not forget the 
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association between the strength-defining cue (semantic categories) and strength. Again, however, 
strength affected only the HR. As in previous research, no effect was observed on the FAR. 
Stretch and Wixted, Morrell et al., and Higham et al. all concluded that participants typically use overall 
information about the strength of the items in the test list (i.e., they assess the difference in memorability 
between strong and weak items) to set an initial decision criterion, but they fail to adjust their criterion on 
a trial-by-trial basis during test, regardless of variations in the strength of the items.  
However, recently, other researchers have reported evidence suggesting that criterion shifts can 
occur within lists under some circumstances (e.g., Dobbins & Kroll, 2005; Han & Dobbins, 2008; Hockley 
& Niewiadomski, 2007; Rhodes & Jacoby, 2007; Singer & Wixted, 2006; Verde & Rotello, 2007). For 
example, Rhodes and Jacoby (2007) presented items at test in one of two locations on a screen, with the 
majority on one side of the screen being old items, and the majority on the other side being new. Across 
three studies, they found that participants shifted their response criterion depending upon where an item 
appeared at test.  Dobbins and Kroll (2005) constructed lists of items that varied in pre-experimental 
familiarity, by intermixing photographs of scenes from the participants’ home campus, and other locations. 
They found a mirror effect, with a higher HR and lower FAR for familiar scenes. However, they also found 
that the FAR portion of the mirror effect disappeared when participants were forced to respond rapidly, or 
with a one-week delay prior to the final test. Singer and Wixted (2006) had participants study items from 
categorised lists (e.g. birds, body parts), with a delay inserted between two study phases, thereby 
creating strong items (recently studied) and weak items (studied prior to the delay). Strong and weak 
items appeared on the same test list. With shorter delays (up to 40 minutes), there was no difference in 
FAR between the two classes of items. However, for a delay of 2 days between the studied lists, there 
was a clear separation of FARs for strong and weak items. Verde & Rotello (2007) reported a series of 
studies in which participants studied strong and weak items before an ordered test in which participants 
were tested on strong and weak items blocked within a single test list. In their first four studies, their 
strength manipulations consistently impacted the HR, but not the FAR, as in Stretch and Wixted (1998). 
However, in their final study, participants received accuracy feedback on a trial-by-trial basis through the 
test. Under these conditions, participants demonstrated a mirror effect, with lower FAR and higher HR for 
the strong items.  
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These demonstrations of differential FAR across classes of items contrast markedly with the 
failure to demonstrate such a shift based on study repetitions manipulated within a list (Stretch & Wixted, 
1998; Morrell et al., 2002; Higham et al., 2009). The aim of the current work is to determine what 
underpins these apparently discrepant findings. To achieve this aim, it is imperative to bridge the 
methodological differences between the studies that have produced the varying outcomes. To date, there 
have been no published demonstrations of within-list mirror effects under experimental conditions similar 
to those in Stretch & Wixted, Morrell et al., and Higham et al., i.e., when strength is manipulated by 
repetition, strong and weak items are randomly ordered in the test list, and there is no test feedback. 
Here, we will present demonstrations of just such a mirror effect pattern in exactly these circumstances.  
A key influence on the methodology adopted in the first two experiments reported here was a 
series of unpublished studies by Tam (2006) investigating recognition memory for words and non-words. 
When Tam combined the use of non-words with a manipulation of strength (repetition) within lists, she 
observed a strength-based mirror effect with both real words and non-words. Aside from the presence of 
the non-words, the conditions of Tam’s studies closely resembled Stretch and Wixted (1998), who found 
no such effect. Here, we attempted to replicate these results in an effort to uncover and identify the 
important factors that moderate the presence of the mirror effect. 
The studies reviewed above collectively demonstrate that people can adjust their response 
criterion within a list, but that they often do not. In their recent discussion of this literature, Rhodes and 
Jacoby (2007) argued that participants may not adjust their response criterion because they fail to see the 
relevance of doing so, even though all the necessary information is available (e.g., Stretch & Wixted, 
1998: strong and weak items were presented in different font colors). Participants may view the 
adjustment of the response criterion as an unnecessary effort that would not be benefit their performance. 
When the relevance of the strength-related dimension is made clear through feedback (e.g., Verde & 
Rotello, 2007) or gross differences between classes of items (e.g., Singer & Wixted, 2006), however, a 
response criterion shift is observed. It is reasonable then to expect that participants can be made to see 
the advantage of a trial-by-trial adjustment of their own response criteria under certain conditions. In 
particular, here we test the idea that one critical predictor is the participants’ perception of their own 
memory for the study list. Specifically, when participants view their memory for the study list as good, 
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there is no motivation or incentive to attend to the non-memorial cues that indicate strength (e.g., font 
color), a task that could be effortful and time consuming. Instead, they rely predominantly on memory 
strength to make recognition judgments, adopting a single criterion throughout the test list. Under such 
circumstances, a person may judge that lack of memory information is diagnostic of the item’s novelty. In 
comparison, when participants perceive their memory for the study list to be poor, they may be motivated 
to search for assistance in the recognition task. One potential source of assistance is the non-memorial 
cues designating strength (e.g., strong and weak words being presented in different font color). For 
instance, if the cues indicate that an item belongs to the weak condition, then participants may adjust their 
response criterion to have low stringency, reasoning that a weak item could easily have been forgotten. 
Such a strategy would maintain a high HR for the weak targets despite a perceived lack of memory for 
the study list. In contrast, if the cues designate high strength, then participants can afford to be more 
stringent in their responding without compromising performance, despite the fact that the overall 
conditions for memory performance are perceived to be poor. Although effortful, adoption of different 
response criteria for strong versus weak items would be motivated by a desire to minimize recognition 
errors under conditions that are perceived to be challenging and would result in a mirror effect.   
Because we believe that the incorporation of the non-memorial strength cues into their 
recognition judgments stems from the participants’ perception of their memory for the study list, we refer 
to this idea as the Global Subjective Memorability (GSM) hypothesis.  If this hypothesis is has any 
validity, then the reason that Tam (2006) found a mirror effect in her studies was that the presence of 
non-words in the study list made participants experience the memory task as difficult, which triggered the 
utilisation of the available test cues, and so adoption of more than one response criterion at test.  
Purpose & Overview of the Experiments 
The purpose of this paper is to study conditions in which a strength-based mirror effect can be 
observed within lists and to identify the key factors that predict when such an effect will be observed. 
Specifically, we are interested in investigating which factors have the effect of soliciting an adjustment of 
the response criterion during test. Three experiments are reported in this paper. In all experiments, 
strength was manipulated within lists by presenting the items either thrice or once at study. The study 
phase was followed by a test phase in which strong targets, strong distractors, weak targets, and weak 
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distractors were randomly intermixed as in Stretch and Wixted (1998), Higham et al. (2009), and Morrell 
et al. (2002). Following Tam (2006), we mixed real words with non-words in Experiments 1 and 2. Our 
expectation was that inclusion of non-words into the study and test lists would decrease subjective 
memorability of the study list. Wixted (1992), for instance, showed that subjects tended to rate extremely 
rare words (words with frequency of occurrence of less than once per 7 million) as low in memorability: 
The median memorability rating on a 1-10 scale for rare words was 4.6, as opposed to 6.4 for low 
frequency words and 8.0 for high frequency words (Experiment 3). (Because participants were very 
unlikely to have encountered these rare words prior to the experiment and almost certainly did not know 
their meaning, they were effectively non-words.) In Experiment 3, we manipulated subjective memorability 
of the study list by varying the length of item presentation at study. In each experiment the key point of 
interest was the existence of a within-list mirror effect.  
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, strength (via repetition) was manipulated within lists (i.e., strong targets were 
presented thrice and weak targets were presented once) and the word list was made up of 144 words and 
40 non-words. So that participants could discriminate between strong and weak items, all the real words 
within each strength level belonged to the same semantic category, as in Morrell et al. (2002) and 
Higham et al. (2009). Additionally, items were labelled at test to specify their strength category (cf., 
Higham et al.; Tam, 2006). Although non-words were included at study and test, recognition performance 
for these were not analysed because our theoretical focus was on the mirror effect for the words. The 
presence of the non-words intended only to reduce subjective memorability for the list overall. Our 
expectation was that if the mirror effect observed in Singer and Wixted (2006) and Tam (2006) is due to 
overall subjective memorability, then it should emerge here also.  
Method 
Participants. Participants were 40 first-year undergraduate students from the University of 
Southampton. They took part in the study in a single group at the end of an introductory psychology 
lecture. They received course credits for their participation or a payment of £5.  
Materials. A list of 144 real English words taken from the MRC psycholinguistic database was 
used for the experiment. All words were common English nouns, between 3 and 8 letters in length, with a 
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Thorndike-Lorge frequency between 50 and 1000. Half of the words represented living items (e.g., 
parsley, goat), whereas the other half represented non-living items (e.g., spoon, clock). Additionally, 40 
non-words were selected from Whittlesea and Williams (2000; Tam, 2006) to be mixed in with the real 
words. As the non-words only represented a portion of the overall list and mainly served the purpose of 
reducing the GSM level of the study list, recognition performance for these items was not analyzed. 
Design. The design was a 2 (prior presentation: target/distractor) X 2 (strength: strong/weak) 
factorial with both factors manipulated within subjects. Ninety-two different items were presented at study. 
Thirty-six of these items were real words presented thrice (strong condition), 36 were real words 
presented once (weak condition), and 20 were non-words presented once, for a total of 164 study trials. 
For half the participants, all living real words were presented thrice, whereas all non-living real words 
were presented once. This strength/item type association was reversed for the other half of participants. 
Study items were printed in capital letters in a random order onto a single sheet of paper. The words were 
organized into 5 columns containing 33 items each except the far right column, which contained 32 items. 
At test, there were 92 targets and 92 distractors. Of the 92 targets, 36 were strong real words, 36 
were weak real words and 20 were non-words. All real-word targets within a given strength category were 
either living or non-living, which varied according to the counterbalance condition. Consequently, it was 
possible to use the living/non-living distinction to define strong and weak distractors. Of the 92 distractors, 
36 were strong real words, 36 were weak real words, and 20 were non-words. Test items were printed in 
capital letters in a random order on five separate sheets of paper containing 41 items each except for the 
final sheet, which contained 20 items.  
Four different study lists and two different test lists were used to rotate items through the 
living/nonliving, old/new, and strong/weak combinations. A different random order was used for each 
study and test format. To highlight the strength category distinction for distractors, test items in the weak 
and strong conditions were accompanied by different cues. In particular, participants were given the 
choice to circle either “1” (presented once) or “0” (new) for both targets and distractors in the weak 
condition, whereas the choices were “3” (presented thrice) or “0” (new) for both targets and distractors in 
the strong condition (Tam, 2006). Space was also provided next to each test item for a 1-6 confidence 
rating (1= low; 6 = high) about the accuracy of the recognition decision.  
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Procedure. Participants were provided with one of eight experimental booklets that contained a 
consent form, study instructions, a study list, test instructions, and a test list, in that order. The study 
instructions were as follows: 
You are about to take part in an experiment on recognition memory.  A list of items is printed on 
the next page (DON’T turn the page yet). You will be given six minutes to study the list, 
approximately two seconds per item. Most of the items are real English words, but others are 
letter strings that look like real words, but aren’t actually legal English words (non-words). Some 
of the real words will be repeated, whereas other real words only appear once. All of the non-
words only appear once. Your job during the study phase of the experiment is to study each item 
and to commit it to memory.  To do so, work systematically through the list, row by row, 
pronouncing each item to yourself. Don’t spend more than two seconds on any of the items or 
you will run out of time before studying the whole list. If you finish studying the list before the time 
is up, start again at the beginning and work systematically through the list again.  
 Participants were then informed that the real English words either represented something living or 
something non-living. Half the participants were informed that living and non-living words would appear 
once and thrice, respectively, whereas this was reversed for the other half of participants.2  
After completion of the study phase, participants were requested to read the test instructions, 
which were as follows (with “X” replaced by “living” and “Y” replaced by “non-living” for half the 
participants, which was reversed for the other half): 
Some test items are printed on the following pages. Your study list had the X items 
presented 3 times and the Y items presented 1 time. Non-words were also presented only 1 time. 
So For each item on the test list you have to decide either: 
For X Items: I saw the word 3 times (3) OR not at all (0) 
For Y Items: I saw the word 1 time (1) OR not at all (0) 
For non-words: I saw the non-word 1 time (1) OR not at all (0) 
You will not have to decide whether you saw an item 1 time or 3 times. Please make your 
response by circling the number corresponding to the number of times you saw the item (either 
“0”, “1”, or “3”; see examples below). After you give your recognition answer for a word please 
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rate your confidence that the decision you made is correct. To do this, enter any integer value 
between 1 and 6 (i.e., 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6) in the space provided. Use the following as a guide: 
1 means you are not at all confident that your decision was correct. 
3 or 4 means you are somewhat confident that your decision was correct (4 indicating a 
little more confident than 3). 
6 means you are very confident that your decision was correct. 
Please note that you can be just as confident about a “0” decision as you might be about 
a “1” or “3” decision. For example, you are probably very confident that your name did not appear 
on the study list (which it didn’t!), because you would have remembered it if it did. So, if one of the 
test words was your name, you would respond “new” to it on the test, and rate your confidence as 
“6”. 
The instruction sheet also contained examples of correct and incorrect methods of filling out the 
required information for each item. After all participants had finished reading the instructions, they were 
permitted to complete the test at their own pace.  
Results and Discussion 
The mean HR and FAR were calculated from the number of positive responses (“1” or “3”) given 
to test items. Also, the SDT measure of discrimination (d’) was calculated from the HR and FAR 
(Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). However, as d’ is undefined with extreme values (i.e., 1 & 0), it was 
calculated after applying Snodgrass and Corwin’s (1988) transformation to HR and FAR. On the other 
hand, for statistical tests conducted directly on HRs and FARs, raw scores were used. The untransformed 
estimates of HR and FAR, and d’ derived from the transformed estimates of HR and FAR, are reported in 
Table 1 as function of strength.  
Single-factor repeated-measures Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) were conducted on the HR, 
FAR, and d’. HR and d’ were higher in the strong condition than in the weak condition, F(1,39) = 66.118, 
MSE = .008, p<.001, η2 = .629, and F(1,39) = 36.529, MSE = .230, p<.001, η2 = .484, respectively. More 
important, there was no effect of strength on the FAR, F < 1.  Although strength exerted an effect on the 
HR, it had no effect on the FAR. This result replicated previous research in which strength was 
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manipulated with repetition within lists (e.g., Higham et al., 2009; Morrell et al., 2002; Stretch & Wixted, 
1998).  
Two mutually exclusive accounts of this null effect on FAR are possible. One is that overall 
subjective memorability does not drive the appearance of the mirror effect, contrary to our GSM 
hypothesis. The alternate possibility is that we failed to lower overall subjective memorability sufficiently to 
trigger a shift in response strategy. We collected confidence-in-accuracy ratings for recognition decisions 
and these data may be useful for testing the GSM hypothesis in that they can be collapsed over 
experimental conditions and provide a measure of participants’ confidence about the list as whole. 
However, there is no clear prediction associated with a single-point estimate of subjective memorability, 
and so we reserve discussion on this point until we have reported data from Experiment 2.  In Experiment 
2 we sought to test the GSM hypothesis once again by substantially increasing the proportion of non-
words in the list. Our expectation, in line with the GSM hypothesis, is that this increase should reduce 
subjective memorability overall, and that this may be sufficient to trigger a strategy shift and produce a 
mirror effect. In contrast, the GSM hypothesis would be considerably weakened if overall subjective 
memorability were significantly lowered without an impact upon the FAR rate.  
Experiment 2 
The aim of Experiment 2 was to reduce the overall subjective memorability of the study list by 
increasing the proportion of study trials involving non-words. The strength manipulation was not applied to 
non-words in Experiment 1, so if this design feature were maintained in Experiment 2, it would have 
meant that a large proportion of trials would not have been analyzed. Consequently, we decided to 
strengthen half of the non-words with repetition, consistent with the treatment of the words. This had the 
benefit of enabling us to test the existence of a within-list mirror effect for the non-words as well as the 
words (cf., Tam, 2006).  
In Experiment 2, 120 items were used overall: 40 of these were real words and 80 were non-
words. However, given the large number of non-words, the semantic association between living and non-
living categories and strength levels (cf., Experiment 1) was replaced by a perceptual association. Strong 
items were presented at test in italics (e.g., CAR, BROOT) and weak items were underlined (e.g., 
CALIDON, PEOPLE) for half of the participants, and this association was reversed for the other half.  
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Method 
Participants. Twenty-three undergraduate students from the University of Southampton took part 
in this study: 11 received academic credits for their participation, whereas 12 received a payment of £5. 
Participants were tested in group sizes between one and seven. All participants signed a consent form to 
allow the treatment of their data.  
Materials. A list of 120 items adapted from Whittlesea and Williams (2000) was used in the 
experiment. Forty of these items were real words and 80 were non-words.  
Design. The experiment had a 2 (prior presentation: target/distractor) X 2 (strength: strong/weak) 
X 2 (item type: real words/non-words) factorial design. At study, 60 items were presented: 20 of these 
items were real words and 40 were non-words. Half of each target set (10 words and 20 non-words) was 
presented only once, whereas the other half was presented three times, which resulted in a 120 study 
trials. Study items were printed in capital letters in a random order onto a single sheet of paper. The items 
were organized into 5 columns containing 24 items each.  
At test, 120 items were presented. Sixty were the targets shown at study, and 60 were distractors 
both divided into 20 real words and 40 non-words. For half the participants, strong targets and distractors 
were presented in italics and weak targets and distractors were underlined, whereas this association was 
reversed for the other half of participants. Participants were informed about this new association between 
the perceptual cue and strength in the same way that participants in Experiment 1 were reminded at test 
about the association between the semantic cue (living/non-living) and strength. Test items were printed 
in capital letters in a random order on three separate sheets of paper containing 43 items each except for 
the final sheet, which contained 34 items. 
Four different study lists and four different test lists were used to rotate items through the 
italics/underlined, old/new, and strong/weak combinations. A different random order was used for each 
study and test format. To highlight the strength-category distinction for distractors, test items in the weak 
and strong conditions were accompanied by the same cues used in Experiment 1. Space was provided 
next to each test item for a 1-6 confidence rating (1= low; 6 = high) about the accuracy of the recognition 
decision. 
Procedure. The procedure of Experiment 2 duplicated that used in Experiment 1. 
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Results and Discussion 
The HR, FAR, and d’ for both words and non-words were calculated as described for Experiment 
1 and are reported in Table 2 as function of strength and item type. Separate 2 (strength: strong/weak) X 
2 (item type: words/non-words) repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted on HR, FAR and d’. For the 
analysis on the HR, both strength, F(1,22) = 43.282, MSE = .017, p<.001, η2 = .666, and item type, 
F(1,22) = 5.570, p = .028, η2 = .202, were significant, showing greater HR for strong targets and real 
words compared to weak targets and non-words, respectively. Follow up analyses indicated that the 
effect of strength on the HR was significant for both words, F(1,22) = 21.471, MSE = .017, p < .001, and 
non-words, F(1,22) = 34.588, MSE = .017, p < .001.  The analysis on the FAR revealed that a mirror 
effect was obtained; that is, the FAR was greater for weak distractors compared to strong distractors, 
F(1,22) = 15.891, MSE = .002, p = .001, η2 = .419. Follow up analyses indicated that the effect of strength 
on the FAR was significant for both words, F(1,22) = 43.500, MSE = .002, p < .001, and non-words, 
F(1,22) = 41.500, MSE = .001, p < .001.  Consistent with the observed mirror effect, better discrimination 
was detected at higher strength, F(1,22) = 80.918, MSE = .303, p<.001, η2 = .786. A main effect of item 
type from the ANOVA on d’ also indicated that discrimination was better for real words than for non-
words, F(1,22) = 8.984, p = .007, η2 = .290, No other main effect or interaction was significant for any of 
these ANOVAs, largest F(1,22) = 2.903, p = .103, η2 = .117.  
Comparison of Experiments 1 and 2. The presence of a strength effect on FAR in Experiment 2 is 
consistent with the GSM hypothesis. However, the GSM hypothesis requires that this shift is the result of 
an overall decline in subjective memorability for the study list. In order to test this prediction, we needed 
an overall measure of subjective memorability for the entire list in each experiment. We took the mean 
confidence ratings assigned across the entire list as our index of subjective memorability for both 
experiments. In line with the GSM hypothesis, overall confidence was higher in Experiment 1 (M = 4.40, 
SD = .606) than in Experiment 2 (M = 4.01, SD = .636), t(61) = 2.408, p = .019. 
Thus, the overall pattern from Experiment 2, in particular the comparison with Experiment 1, is 
consistent with the GSM hypothesis. In line with the work of Tam (2006), we observed a within-list 
strength-based mirror effect, even though participants were made aware of the strength status of items 
only at test (cf. Stretch & Wixted, 1998). Participants in Experiment 2, but not Experiment 1, showed an 
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elevated FAR for weaker items, indicative of an item-by-item change of response criterion. In line with the 
GSM hypothesis, overall subjective memorability for the list was lower in Experiment 2 than Experiment 1.  
If the GSM account is correct, then the same pattern should be obtained with any manipulation 
that reduces subjective memorability enough to trigger a shift in response strategy. In particular, the 
mirror effect should not be due to the presence of non-words in the list. Consequently, in Experiment 3 we 
manipulated the subjective memorability of the list by manipulating the study time per item at encoding.  
Experiment 3 
In Experiments 1 and 2, support for the GSM hypothesis was based on a comparison of 
performance between experiments and by varying the ratio of words to non-words. However, the GSM 
hypothesis is not specifically tied to the use of non-words, and so in Experiment 3, we manipulated overall 
subjective memorability within a single experiment involving only real words.  
We also took this opportunity to address other methodological differences between Experiments 
1 and 2 that might account for the differing results. In Experiment 1, where no mirror effect was found, 
item strength was associated with semantic category membership (living or non-living) and this 
association was introduced at study. Similarly, semantic strength-defining cues were introduced at study 
in Morrell et al. (2002), and they too found no mirror effects. In contrast, in Experiment 2, where we 
observed mirror effects, strength was associated with perceptual cues (italics/underlining) and these cues 
were only introduced at test. Tam (2006) also introduced her perceptual strength-defining cues (colors) at 
test and she also found mirror effects. Thus, the discrepant findings between Experiments 1 and 2 (and 
between Morrell et al. on the one hand versus Tam on the other) could be due to (1) the fact that the 
property of the item that is associated with the strength manipulation is critical (i.e., perceptual properties 
produce the mirror effects whereas semantic properties do not), (2) the timing of the introduction of the 
cues (i.e., cues introduced at test produce the effect whereas cues introduced at study do not), or (3) both 
of these factors. Potentially, perceptual cues and/or new cues appearing for the first time at test are highly 
salient causing participants to attend to them and incorporate them into their recognition judgments. To 
test this idea, in Experiment 3 we reverted to the methodology used in Experiment 1. If the GSM 
hypothesis is correct, then the mirror effect should emerge under conditions of low GSM regardless of the 
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timing or nature of the strength cues. Conversely, if it is either (or both) the timing/nature of the cues that 
is critical, and not GSM, then no mirror effect should occur in any condition.3  
The variable chosen for the purpose of manipulating GSM in Experiment 3 was the length of item 
presentation at study (presentation rate). Because presentation rate also acts as a strength variable in its 
own right (e.g., Hockley & Niewiadomski, 2007), it allowed us to test for a between-list mirror effect based 
on it, as well as the within-list mirror effect based on repetition. A longer presentation rate (e.g., 3 s per 
item) should create higher subjective memorability than a shorter presentation rate (e.g., 0.5 s per item). 
Thus, if the GSM hypothesis is correct, a within-list repetition-based mirror effect should be more likely in 
the condition in which the study list presented at the faster rate. As only real words were used in 
Experiment 3, the semantic association between strength levels and living/non living categories used in 
Experiment 1 was reintroduced so that participants can benefit from an added cue to item strength.  
Method 
Participants. Participants were 32 undergraduate students from the University of Southampton. 
Twenty-two received a payment of £5 for their time and 10 received course credit. Sixteen were randomly 
assigned to each of the long and short presentation groups. 
Materials. The same 144 real words used in Experiment 1 were used again in Experiment 3.  
Design. The experiment used a 2 (prior presentation: target/distractor) X 2 (strength: 
strong/weak) X 2 (presentation rate: long/short) mixed design, with only the presentation rate varied 
between subjects. Participants in the long- and short-presentation rate groups were presented with words 
at study for 3 s and 0.5 s each, respectively. Only one presentation rate was used per group. Four 
different study lists were created, each with a different random selection of 36 words from each of the 72 
living and 72 non-living word pools. For two of the study lists, living words were presented thrice (strong 
condition) and non-living words were presented once (weak condition), whereas this strength/semantic 
category association was reversed for the other two lists. An equal number of participants viewed each 
study list. At test, all 144 items were presented of which 72 were targets and 72 were distractors. Four 
different test lists were used, each corresponding to a given study list. For the 72 distractors on each test, 
the 36 remaining words from one semantic category (e.g., living) were assigned to the strong condition 
and 36 from the other category (e.g., non-living) were assigned to the weak condition. It was ensured with 
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this assignment that all targets and distractors within a given strength condition were either living or non-
living, which depended on the counterbalance condition. A different random order of presentation was 
used for each study and test list. 
Procedure. The procedure of Experiment 3 is the same as that of Experiment 1 with the following 
exceptions. Words were presented to participants as a slide-show presentation on the computer screen of 
a Macintosh computer. Words appeared in the centre of the screen, black font (size 48) on white 
background. Participants in the long- and short-presentation rate groups studied each word for 3 s and 
0.5 s, respectively. The inter-stimulus interval was 1 s in both groups. All timing was controlled by the 
computer. At test, words appeared on the computer screen one at a time. Weak test items were 
accompanied by a cue to either select a button (using the mouse) at the bottom-right of the computer 
screen if the item was new, or to select a button at the bottom left of the computer screen if the item was 
presented once. The choices for strong test items were between “new” and “presented three times”. The 
same 6-point confidence scale was used, but responses were collected by requiring participants to click 
one of six radio buttons at the bottom of the screen.  
Results and Discussion 
The HR, FAR, and d’ were calculated as in the previous experiments and are reported in Table 3 
as function of presentation rate and repetition. A 2 (presentation rate: long/short) X 2 (repetition: 
thrice/once) mixed ANOVA was conducted on the HR which revealed a significant main effect of 
repetition, F(1,30) = 51.967, MSE = .009, p<.001, η2 = .634, indicating a higher HR for thrice-presented 
targets compared to once-presented targets. The analysis also revealed a marginal effect of presentation 
rate, F(1,30) = 3.885, MSE = .044, p = .058, η2 = .115. The interaction was not significant, F < 1.  
An analogous ANOVA conducted on the FAR revealed both a main effect of repetition, F(1,30) = 
9.201, MSE = .008, p = .005, η2 = .235, and a main effect of presentation rate, F(1,30) = 4.971, MSE = 
.035, p = .033, η2 = .142. These main effects were qualified by a significant interaction, F(1,30) = 5.355, 
MSE = .008, p = .028, η2 = .151. Pair-wise comparisons showed that there was no effect of repetition at 
the long-presentation rate, F < 1 (strong = .109, SD = .121; weak = .125, SD = .112), but that there was at 
the short-presentation rate, F(1,15) = 13.5, MSE = .008, p = .002 (strong = .163, SD = .179; weak = .279, 
SD = .160).  
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An analogous ANOVA conducted on d’ indicated both a main effect of repetition, F(1,30) = 
86.544, MSE = .212, p<.001, η2 = .743, and a main effect of presentation rate, F(1,30) = 7.605, MSE = 
.1.440, p = .010, η2 = .202. The interaction was marginally significant, F(1,30) = 3.591, MSE = .212, p = 
.068, η2 = .107. The main effects indicated better discrimination for thrice-presented than for once-
presented items, and better discrimination when the presentation rate was long compared to short.  
Confidence ratings were again analyzed to establish whether a mirror effect only emerged in low 
GSM conditions, as predicted by the GSM hypothesis. As previously, mean confidence across all items in 
the test list was computed. As predicted, mean confidence was marginally higher in the long-presentation 
group (M = 4.75, SD = .448) than in the short-presentation group (M = 4.41, SD = .540), t(30) = 1.919, p = 
.066.  
As anticipated, repetition-based mirror effect occurred within lists in the short-presentation group 
of Experiment 3, but not in the long-presentation group. This pattern is consistent with the idea that the 
subjective memorability conditions of the experiment drive the likelihood of obtaining a within-list mirror 
effect. With such a mechanism, the fact that presentation rate moderated the repetition-based mirror 
effect can be easily explained: the low GSM in the short-presentation group caused participants to attend 
to available test cues and adjust their response criteria accordingly, whereas in the high GSM condition, 
test cues were mostly ignored, and no criterion shift was effected.  Crucially, these data make clear that 
the previous results from both Experiments 1 and 2, and from Tam (2006) are not simply due to the 
presence of non-words in the study list. The results from the short-presentation group also make clear 
that a within-list mirror effect can be observed when strength cues are introduced at study and when the 
property associated with strength is semantic. Thus, the results of Experiment 3 indicate that the failure to 
observe a mirror effect in Experiment 1 could not have been solely due to the nature of the strength cues 
or when the strength cues were introduced.  
General Discussion 
To summarize our results, a within-list, strength-based mirror effect was not obtained for words in 
Experiment 1 when only a small portion of study trials (12%) and test trials (22%) were non-words. 
However, in Experiment 2, when the majority of study and test trials were non-words (both 67%), a mirror 
effect occurred within lists for both words and non-words. Finally, in Experiment 3, a mirror effect occurred 
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in the short- but not the long-presentation group even though no non-words were included in any of the 
lists. For the most part across experiments (although see discussion below), list-wide confidence in the 
accuracy of recognition judgments (i.e., confidence averaged across the test list as a whole) was lower in 
the conditions that produced the mirror effect than in the conditions where no mirror effect was obtained.   
The Global Subjective Memorability Hypothesis 
We have hypothesized that it is the subjective memorability of the study list as a whole that 
partially determines whether a strength-based mirror effect will occur within lists, a hypothesis we have 
referred to as the GSM hypothesis. Our argument has been that GSM affects the strategies that 
participants adopt prior to taking the recognition test. In this section, we will outline the GSM hypothesis in 
greater detail.  
At the most basic level, the question of whether or not a mirror effect occurs within lists comes 
down to the extent to which participants attend to and use the test cues designating strength (e.g., 
semantic category, color, italics/underlining, and so on). If these cues are ignored, strong and weak 
distractors will be treated similarly, and a single FAR will obtain. Conversely, if the cues are attended to, 
there is a potential that the response criterion will be adjusted accordingly.  
According to the GSM hypothesis, if GSM of the study list is high (i.e., the study list, rightly or 
wrongly, is considered easy to learn), the cues are ignored, and all test items are judged according to a 
single, default response strategy based on memory strength. Participants will view their memory for the 
study list as good enough to guarantee successful performance based on memory strength alone, so they 
do not engage in the effortful task of attending to the non-memorial strength cues to adjust their response 
strategies. Therefore, both strong and weak test items (as designated by the non-memorial strength cues) 
that are low on the strength-of-evidence dimension (predominantly distractors) are judged to be “new” 
because their low strength is considered diagnostic of their novelty. Under such circumstances, 
participants can be said to be using the metacognitive strategy as discussed by Strack and Bless (1994), 
producing a single, low FAR for strong and weak distractors and no mirror effect.  
On the other hand, in conditions of low GSM (i.e., the study list, rightly or wrongly, is considered 
hard to learn), participants believe that they should not rely solely on memory strength to make 
recognition judgments because it is not necessarily diagnostic of prior presentation. For example, under 
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such conditions, forgetting as well as novelty can cause low memory strength for a given item. Forgetting 
is particularly likely for weak items, so participants are assumed to go to the added trouble of attending to 
the non-memorial test cues designating strength (semantic category, color, and so on) to adjust their 
response criterion on an item-by-item basis. Doing so will minimize the number of errors on the memory 
test. In particular, strong items, which are deemed less likely to have been forgotten than weak items, are 
judged according to the same default metacognitive strategy that is used under high GSM conditions. 
Conversely, a more liberal response criterion is adopted for the weak items that are regarded more likely 
to have been forgotten because they are judged according to the presuppositional strategy (Strack & 
Bless, 1994; i.e., forgetting is presupposed to be likely). Although effortful, attending to the cues in this 
way will maintain a high HR for weak items even under poor memory conditions. However, the trade-off is 
that the FAR for weak items will also be high, exceeding the FAR for strong distractors. This result, 
coupled with an effect of strength on the HR, produces the strength-based mirror effect. 
The GSM hypothesis provides a relatively straightforward explanation for why strength-based 
mirror effects were observed within lists in some of our experiments but not in others. In Experiment 1, 
although we attempted to create low GSM by including non-words at study and test (e.g., Chalmers & 
Humphreys, 1998; Chalmers, Humphreys & Dennis, 1997; Whittlesea & Williams, 1998; Wixted, 1992) 
there is actually some evidence that by only including a small proportion of such items, they became 
distinctive, thus potentially increasing, rather than decreasing, the GSM of the list. For example, the non-
word FAR (0.171) was the same as the FAR for weak words (0.174), whereas the (once-presented) non-
word HR (0.723) exceeded the HR for the (once-presented) weak words (0.658). In contrast, in 
Experiment 2, the inclusion of a greater proportion of non-words in the study and test lists had the desired 
effect: Non-word discrimination was lower than that for words across both strength categories, and overall 
confidence was lower than in Experiment 1. As predicted by the GSM hypothesis, this lower confidence 
and accuracy was associated with within-list mirror effects for both classes of items. Finally, in Experiment 
3, in which GSM was manipulated with presentation rate within the same experiment, a mirror effect 
occurred in the short-presentation condition (with low GSM and confidence) but not in the long-
presentation condition (with high GSM and confidence).  
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Other Potential Accounts 
 In this section, we consider some alternative explanations of our results. Singer and Wixted 
(2006) discussed whether substantial differences in d’ might promote within-list criterion shifts leading to a 
mirror effect. In their studies, within-list mirror effects occurred only when a long (2-day) retention interval 
was used, which also corresponded to a large difference in d’ between the short- and long-retention 
interval conditions. However, despite this result, a broader reading of the literature led them to conclude 
that large d’ differences were neither necessary nor sufficient to promote criterion shifts. Indeed, our own 
data concur with this conclusion. The average difference in d’ between the strong versus weak conditions 
when the mirror effect occurred was 0.94, which was numerically smaller than the average d’ difference 
when the mirror effect was absent (0.97). Singer and Wixted noted that delay may be a particularly salient 
variable as far as participants are concerned, being subject to metacognitive reasoning about its effects 
on memory. Thus, when there is large difference in the study-test delay for the items in the test list, 
participants attend to the cues designating strength and adjust their response criterion accordingly. 
 In our view, Singer and Wixted’s (2006) analysis is quite compatible with the GSM hypothesis. In 
essence, their argument is that it is not overall objective memorability or even between-class differences 
in objective memorability (i.e., d’) that determines whether the strength-defining cues are used to set the 
criterion during the recognition test. Instead, the critical factor is subjective memorability, which is reliant 
on metacognitive theories about the way that memory works and the variables that influence it. It is 
intriguing to us that long-retention intervals are considered important enough to cause participants to 
attend to test cues, but that repetition is not, at least under most circumstances. Based on our results, 
repetition will only lead to test-cue utilization if the testing situation is considered particularly challenging 
and confidence is low, such as when the study list consisted mostly of non-words (Experiment 2) or when 
the presentation rate was particularly short (Experiment 3). A fruitful avenue of future research will be to 
investigate metacognitive theories about recognition memory as these seem to be the key to 
understanding when mirror effects will occur within lists and when they will not. 
 Perhaps it is not surprising that differences in d’ between the strength conditions are unable to 
account for participants’ willingness to incorporate test cues into their recognition judgments. After all, 
such an explanation assumes that participants mostly know when they are performing well and when they 
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are not. Although this monitoring ability may be reasonably good, there will certainly be cases when the 
correlation between overall recognition performance and the assessment of that performance breaks 
down. Consider instead a dual-process memorability account of within-list mirror effects in which 
participants monitor recollection, rather than the amount of old/new discrimination. Unlike simple old/new 
discrimination, recollection has been shown to be associated with excellent metacognitive monitoring 
(e.g., Higham, 2002; Higham et al., 2009; Payne, Jacoby & Lambert, 2004); people know when they are 
recollecting information and when they are failing to do so, except perhaps under circumstances 
especially designed to produce considerable amounts of false recollection (e.g., Roediger & McDermott, 
1995). Under this dual-process hypothesis, if there is a large difference in the amount of recollection 
between the strength conditions, participants will attend to the strength-defining cues and a mirror effect 
will be observed. One rationale for such behavior is that if there is large amount of recollection for strong 
targets but very little for weak targets, the strong targets may subjectively stand out from the other (weak) 
targets and distractors. Hence, attending to the strength cues could be helpful under these circumstances 
because any items designated “strong” which do not elicit a large amount recollection can be easily and 
confidently rejected.  
 The main problem with this account is that recollection and recognition discrimination are highly 
correlated; if recollection is high, then it is likely that discrimination will be also because recollection 
generally leads to confident, accurate recognition decisions (e.g., Yonelinas, 1994). Although we did not 
specifically measure recollection, it would be difficult to explain how there was a bigger recollection 
difference between the strength conditions in our experiments that produced a mirror effect, than between 
the conditions that did not, when the corresponding discrimination (d’) difference was numerically smaller. 
 Other explanations of within-list criterion shifts have focused on the importance of feedback (e.g., 
Han & Dobbins, 2008; Rhodes & Jacoby, 2007; Verde & Rotello, 2007). When feedback on recognition 
accuracy is provided, participants are more likely to adopt a conservative criterion on easy trials and a 
liberal one on hard trials, and to shift the criterion on a trial-by-trial basis. Although we did not explicitly 
provide feedback in our experiments, participants presumably spontaneously monitor their own test 
performance, especially when prompted to provide retrospective confidence judgments about the 
correctness of their responses. This monitoring process no doubt provides implicit feedback that is more 
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likely to be accurate, and possibly relied on more heavily, when the memory conditions of the experiment 
are good. If so, then the GSM hypothesis prediction is that criterion shifts are more likely under objectively 
good memory conditions than under poor ones. However, as noted above, there is no evidence in our 
research, or in the research discussed by Singer and Wixted (2006), that within-list criterion shifts are 
moderated by d’.  
 Rhodes and Jacoby (2007) found that in the absence of feedback, participants were more likely 
to shift their criterion according to the placement of a test item on the computer monitor that was 
associated with a particular old-item base-rate probability if that placement had just switched from the 
previous trial rather than remained the same. In the context of our experiments, an analogous result 
would be that strength-based criterion shifts would be more likely if the currently judged item belonged to 
a different strength condition than the previously judged item. However, we found no evidence for this 
pattern of results. For example, participants in the short- and long-presentation groups of Experiment 3 
rated the test items in exactly the same order (four different random orders in each group), yet a mirror 
effect was observed in the former, but not the latter group.  
Finally, it must be considered that a criterion shift is not necessary for the observation of the 
mirror effect. In contrast to the criterion-shift account of the mirror effect, a differential-distribution 
explanation argues that the effect occurs because there are two distractor distributions positioned at 
different points on the strength-of-evidence scale (e.g., Criss, 2006; Criss & McClelland, 2006; SLiM, 
McClelland & Chappell, 1998; REM, Shiffrin & Steyvers, 1997): The weak distractor distribution is on 
average higher on the strength-of-evidence scale than the strong distractor distribution. Hence, a higher 
FAR is observed for weak than for strong distractors. However, as noted, distractors are not presented at 
study and not strengthened, and, thus, it is not clear why the distractor distributions should shift as a 
function of strength. One possibility is that distractors and targets are similar on the basis of an 
association established at encoding, so that once a target is strengthened, an associated distractor may 
also be strengthened (e.g., RACCOON is a target presented thrice, and BADGER is a potentially strong 
distractor, as both belong to the same animals taxonomic category; Higham et al., 2009). However, the 
results of Experiment 2 make this explanation less plausible, as no association is established at encoding 
between targets and distractors of the same strength level. In fact, both cues provided (i.e., the 
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italics/underlined cue and the test tag) only appear at test. Therefore, a criterion-shift account of the 
mirror effect seems the most economical and probable in this case. 
Limitations of the Global Subjective Memorability Hypothesis 
Although we believe that the GSM hypothesis is currently the best available account of our 
experimental results and for those of the other studies discussed above, it is not without limitations and 
problems as it currently stands. First, a comparison of mean confidence ratings in Experiments 1 and 3 
presents an important anomaly: The average confidence rating in Experiment 1 (M = 4.40), where no 
mirror effect was observed, is nearly identical to the average confidence rating in the short-presentation-
rate group of Experiment 3 (M = 4.41), where a clear mirror effect was found.4 This appears to contradict 
the claim of the GSM hypothesis that subjective memorability of the study list affects strategic control at 
test, as participants who are equally confident in their own memory performance produce opposite 
patterns of behavior.  
However, this anomalous result is confounded in that non-words were used in Experiment 1 but 
not Experiment 3. If the non-word ratings are eliminated from the analysis and only confidence ratings for 
words are compared between experiments, the confidence data are wholly consistent with the GSM 
hypothesis: The mean confidence ratings for the conditions where a mirror effect was observed 
(Experiment 2 and the short-presentation-rate group in Experiment 3) are lower (4.43 and 4.41, 
respectively) than the mean confidence ratings for the conditions where mirror effects were not found (in 
Experiment 1 and in the long-presentation-rate group of Experiment 3: 4.51 and 4.75, respectively).  
However, these comparisons, as well as those between Experiments 1 and 2 that include non-
words reported above, must be treated with caution for a number of reasons. First, even if only 
confidence ratings for words are compared, there are still a number of methodological differences 
between the three experiments, rendering direct contrasts potentially problematic. For example, 
Experiments 1 and 2 were conducted using pen-and-paper format, whereas Experiment 3 was 
computerized. Moreover, the presentation of the study list was massed in Experiments 1 and 2, whereas 
it was item-by-item in Experiment 3. Comparing confidence without concern for these methodological 
differences presupposes an absolutist view of confidence ratings that ignores the experimental contexts 
in which the ratings are given. Nonetheless, despite the fact that the current experiments fail to provide 
  The mirror effect and subjective memorability (C481) 26 
definitive evidence in support of the GSM hypothesis, there are no competing theories in the recognition 
literature that can potentially explain all the vagaries of strength-based criterion shifts within lists in such a 
parsimonious manner. Consequently, we believe the GSM hypothesis is at least a reasonable contender 
and worthy of further investigation in subsequent research. 
This subsequent research might utilize other types of metacognitive judgments to test the GSM 
hypothesis more fully. For instance, global judgments of study-list memorability could be collected after 
study and prior to test and/or at various points throughout the test list. These ratings, if paired with 
retrospective confidence judgments, could be indicative of whether metacognitive/presuppositional 
strategies are adopted prior to the test or whether there are strategic shifts at certain points during testing. 
Another possibility is to administer a post-hoc questionnaire to enquire more specifically about conscious 
strategies that participants might be using. We have not specified whether the adoption of specific 
response strategies during the recognition test is conscious and deliberate or whether it occurs at a more 
intuitive, perhaps unconscious, level (Han & Dobbins, 2008). Metacognitive measures in addition to 
retrospective confidence ratings might help to elucidate this issue, along with several others. 
Conclusion 
Despite some limitations outlined above, the GSM hypothesis appears to be the only account that 
is able to explain our current demonstrations of strength-based mirror effects within lists. The GSM 
hypothesis suggests that under subjectively poor memory conditions, people are distrusting of the 
diagnostic value of the memory information for test items and they are willing to use non-memorial test 
cues to facilitate the recognition decision. This idea draws similarities with the outshining hypothesis 
proposed by Smith (1988). The reinstatement at test of meaningless contextual cues (e.g., a smell, item 
position on a computer screen) associated with study items has a strong effect on recall, but its effect on 
recognition is inconsistent. According to the outshining principle, the test probe at recognition is such a 
strong cue in itself that it outshines the effect of contextual cues, rendering them ineffective in altering 
performance. In contrast, contextual cues help recall, as no test probes are provided. Similarly, it appears 
that non-memorial test cues are outshone by memory information proper in recognition tests with high 
GSM, but are employed by participants in recognition tests with low  GSM.  
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Footnotes 
1. It should be noted that because distractors are not presented at study, they cannot be 
strengthened. Distractors are only labelled “strong” or “weak” on the basis of their association to strong or 
weak targets, respectively. 
2. We would have preferred to present the study list on an item-by-tem basis, which is the more 
common method in the literature. However, because participants were tested in a large, single group, this 
method was not possible. The greatest danger with the methodology we used is that our repetition 
(strength) manipulation would have been nullified because participants may have studied once-presented 
(weak) items more than once or studied thrice-presented items less than three times. To lessen the 
likelihood of this occurring with any consistency, the items were randomly ordered in the study list and 
different random orders were used for different participants. The randomization technique appears to 
have worked because, as will become clear, a robust and consistent strength effect was observed on the 
HR in conditions in which this methodology was used. Nonetheless, to eliminate any potential problems 
that this methodology might have created, single-item presentation was used in the study phase of 
Experiment 3. 
 3. Stretch and Wixted (1998) used perceptual cues to define the strength categories and found no 
strength-based mirror effects. Consequently, it seems unlikely that it was the perceptual versus semantic 
nature of the cues that accounts for the differences between Experiments 1 and 2. Nonetheless, it 
seemed prudent to hold the nature of the cues constant in Experiment 3 to eliminate it as a potential 
contributor to the observed pattern of results.  
4. We thank an anonymous reviewer for noting this comparison.  
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Table 1 
Mean (SD) HR, FAR, and d’ by Strength Level and type of item in Experiment 1. 
Strength  
 
  Measure Strong Weak 
HR .822 (.098) .658 (.178) 
FAR .174 (.159) .170 (.110) 
d’ 2.213 (.923) 1.565 (.773) 
Note: HR = hit rate; FAR =  false alarm rate; d’ = discrimination. The HR and FAR for once-presented 
non-words were .723 and .171, respectively. 
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Table 2 
Mean (SD) HR, FAR, and d’ by Strength Level and Type Of Item in Experiment 2. 
 Words Non-words 
Measure Strong Weak Strong Weak 
HR 
.870 
(.166)  
.691 
(.200) 
.785 
(.195) 
.559 
(.189) 
FAR 
.139 
(.162)  
.226 
(.209) 
.185 
(.169) 
.270 
(.155) 
d’ 
2.192 
(.721)  
1.302 
(.625) 
1.822 
(.710) 
.793 
(.690) 
Note: HR = hit rate; FAR = false alarm rate; d’ = discrimination. 
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Table 3 
Mean (SD) HR, FAR, and d’ by Strength Level and Presentation Rate In Experiment 3. 
 Long Presentation Short Presentation 
Measure Thrice Once Thrice Once 
HR 
.920 
(.082)  
.759 
(.182) 
.828 
(.185) 
.644 
(.179) 
FAR 
.109 
(.121)  
.125 
(.112) 
.163 
(.179) 
.279 
(.160) 
d’ 
2.926 
(.954)  
2.073 
(.888) 
2.317 
(1.131) 
1.028 
(.570) 
Note: HR =  hit rate; FAR =  false alarm rate; d’ = discrimination. 
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 Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Single-dimension, signal detection model for recognition. HR = hit rate; FAR = false 
alarm rate; MR = miss rate; CRR = correct rejection rate; C = old/new criterion. 
Figure 2. Criterion-shift model of the strength-based mirror effect. D = distractor distribution; CW = 
response criterion for weak items; CS = response criterion for strong items; TW = weak-target distribution; 
TS = strong-target distribution. 
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Figure 1 (C481). 
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Figure 2 (C481). 
 
